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Savage Tables and Tort Law: An Alternative
to the Precaution Model
Janet M. Curriet & W. Bentley MacLeodtt
INTRODUCTION
The model of precaution has become a central tool of law
and economics, beginning with Judge Learned Hand's brilliant
opinion in United States v Carroll Towing Co.' In it he argues
that a defendant should be found liable for harm if and only if
the expected cost of additional care is less than the expected
benefit. 2
The model of precaution relies upon the economics of incen-
tives, a subfield of game theory-the study of how individuals
choose actions when these actions affect others.3 The landmark
books of Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner,
and Professor Steven Shavell illustrate how the precaution
model illuminates a wide variety of legal rules.4 Professor Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed show how it can be used to
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159 F2d 169 (2d Cir 1947).
2 See id at 173.
3 For an early game-theoretic analysis of tort law, see generally John Prather
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J Legal Stud 323 (1973). For an explicit
game-theoretic analysis of the Hand Rule, see generally Allan M. Feldman and
Jeonghyun Kim, The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. Reconsidered,
7 Am L & Econ Rev 523 (2005).
4 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort
Law 52-53 (Harvard 1987); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 2-3
(Harvard 1987).
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integrate tort and property. 5 Professor Robert Cooter uses the
model to provide a unified analysis of tort and contract.6
A central result of the model is that the standard for negli-
gence provides incentives for individuals to take socially optimal
actions.7 This perspective is controversial. Professor Richard Ep-
stein argues that the model of precaution cannot explain ob-
served law and does not provide an adequate model of causation
as used in court.8 He suggests that the socially efficient rule
should be one of strict liability.9 Posner responds, providing a
number of examples in which Epstein's approach would lead to
undesirable results.1O He describes Epstein's model as being
based upon moral rather than economic considerations."
In this Article we show that the model of precaution is a
special case of a more general economic model. We develop a
simple technique for discussing this more general model that we
dub a "Savage Table,"'12 following Professor Leonard Savage.13
Our more general model based on general equilibrium theory
and decision theory encompasses the views of both Posner and
Epstein and sheds light on Epstein's observation that the Hand
Rule is not consistently used to determine liability.14 We show
that rational choice does not imply the Hand Rule unless one
imposes additional restrictions that are not often satisfied in
practice.
We show that strict liability can be viewed as a special case
of the negligence standard. In addition, the notion of a causal ef-
fect can be easily and naturally defined in our framework. The
benefit of a clear definition is that it highlights the key evi-
dentiary requirements to determine causation. Recent work
in statistics has greatly clarified our understanding of causal
5 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1089-93 (1972).
6 See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precau-
tion, 73 Cal L Rev 1, 43-45 (1985).
7 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J Legal Stud 29, 40-41 (1972).
8 See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J Legal Stud 151, 154-60,
164-65 (1973).
9 Id at 203.
10 See Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J Legal Stud 205,205-12 (1973).
1 See id at 220. For a discussion of recent developments regarding the debate between
Epstein and Posner, see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a General Theory of Tort Law:
Strict Liability in Context, 3 J Tort L 1, 6-10 (2010).
12 See Table 1.
'3 See generally Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (Dover 1972).
14 See Epstein, 2 J Legal Stud at 164-65 (cited in note 8).
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inference.15 There is no way to prove the existence of a causal rela-
tionship. The best we can do is to use a credible model of the
world and make causal statements within the context of the
model.16
Once we look at economic phenomena from our more general
perspective, we are led to the following legal-impossibility theo-
rem: For every legal rule that is potentially efficient there exists
an environment with rational decision makers for which the rule
is not efficient. A rational decision maker must make choices condi-
tional upon the information she has. Given incomplete infor-
mation, there is no guarantee that a rule that encourages good
decision making in one context will work in another.
Posner observed that the best way to deal with this problem
is to rely upon empirical evidence.17 Models are still useful. In
fact Professor Paul Holland shows that model building is essen-
tial to the measurement of causal effects.18 Theory and evidence
must work together to identify those worldviews that are more
successful than the alternatives.
The plan for the rest of the Article is as follows. The next
Part provides a very brief discussion of the background theory
we use. This is followed by a simplified presentation of the main
ideas of the economic theory of exchange and rational choice, in
particular the key notions of a "commodity," an "act," and a Sav-
age Table, which provides a convenient way to illustrate these con-
cepts. We show that this model leads naturally to a well-defined
notion of causality and relate it to the work of Holland.19 We
then illustrate how these ideas can be applied to tort law and
discuss some of the empirical work in the area, with particular
reference to our own empirical research on tort law.
I. BACKGROUND
The purpose of this Article is to briefly outline an alterna-
tive to the standard model of precaution. This alternative relies
upon ideas developed in the 1950s by Professors Herbert Simon,
15 See Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J Am Stat Assn 945,
945 (1986).
16 See id at 959.
17 See Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 221 (cited in note 10).
18 See Holland, 81 J Am Stat Assn at 959 (cited in note 15).
19 See id.
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Leonard Savage, Kenneth Arrow, and Gerard Debreu.20 These
ideas are now taught to all first-year economics students.21 Sav-
age's ideas were integrated into modern game theory by Profes-
sors David Kreps and Robert Wilson,22 and later applied to the
law by Professors Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randal
Picker.23 Professor Nabil Al-Najjar shows that many of these
ideas can be reformulated in a Bayesian framework and applied
to important issues in regulation, such as climate change.24
Debreu was awarded the 1983 Nobel Prize in economics for
his lucid development of the two welfare theorems of general
equilibrium theory.25 The first welfare theorem states that when
markets are "complete" then competitive equilibria are efficient.
The second welfare theorem is that efficient allocations can be
realized as the outcome of a competitive equilibrium. These very
technical results were later popularized by Professor Milton
Friedman, who argued that a free market is the best way to al-
locate resources. 26 Yet, strictly speaking, the welfare theorems
cannot be applied to observed economies because markets in
practice are always incomplete. Friedman recognized this prob-
lem, but he reasoned that in an economy with free markets,
markets would become more complete, and therefore more effi-
cient, over time.27
20 See Gerard Debreu, Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equi-
librium 74-89 (Yale 1959); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69
Q J Econ 99, 99-100 (1955); Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equi-
librium for a Competitive Economy, 22 Econometrica 265, 265-66 (1954). See also gener-
ally Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (cited in note 13).
21 See, for example, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green,
Microeconomic Theory 687-725 (Oxford 1995). For a well-ahead-of-the-times application
of these ideas to the problem of standard-form contracts, see Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 Cal L Rev 1151, 1167-68 (1976).
22 See David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, Sequential Equilibria, 50 Econometrica
863, 871 (1982).
23 See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory
and the Law 83-89 (Harvard 1994).
24 See Nabil I. Al-Najjar, A Bayesian Framework for Precautionary Policies *4-14
(working paper, May 20, 2013), online at http://www.ihs.ac.at/vienna/resources/Economics
/Papers/20130606_PaperAlNajjar 2.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
25 The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
1983: Gerard Debreu, Press Release, Nobelprize.org (Nobel Media AB 2013 Oct 17, 1983),
online at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1983/press.html
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
26 See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 38 (Chicago 1962).
27 See id at 11-17.
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Professor Oliver Hart showed that adding more markets
could, however, lead to less efficient outcomes. 28 Thus, as long as
markets remain incomplete, there may be a role for legal institu-
tions to make markets work more efficiently. Hart applied insights
from Arrow and Debreu's general equilibrium theory to the un-
derstanding of property law as it applies to the theory of the
firm.29
This Article considers the application of ideas from Arrow
and Debreu to a second aspect of civil law, tort law. The stand-
ard model of precaution supposes that individuals respond in a
predictable fashion to the incentives provided by the tort system.
Yet, as we will see, the empirical evidence suggests that the extent
to which the tort system reduces the costs of injuries is sensitive to
the context. We use Savage Tables, developed using Debreu's notion
of a commodity3° combined with the seminal ideas of Savage, to
explain this sensitivity to context. 31 A richer theory of tort sug-
gests a more nuanced role for the courts than simply setting
rules for potential tortfeasors such that the benefits of taking
precaution are weighed against the costs of causing harm.
II. THE NOTION OF A COMMODITY
Debreu's classic, Theory of Value, provides a model of a
world with scarce resources and individuals who care about how
these resources are allocated.32 The model provides a very gen-
eral way to think about the world: inefficient outcomes stem
from failures of the environment to satisfy the axioms of general
equilibrium theory. Hence, the theory provides a benchmark for
evaluating any allocation of resources. 33
Debreu introduces the idea of a "commodity" that generaliz-
es our concept of a good or service. 34 First of all, a commodity
28 See Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure
Is Incomplete, 11 J Econ Theory 418, 442 (1975).
29 See Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 71 (Oxford 1995).
30 See Part II.
31 See Part III.
32 Debreu, Theory of Value at 90-92 (cited in note 20).
33 See id at 74-90.
34 Id at 32. Debreu cites Professor J.R. Hicks, Value and Capital 33-34 (Clarendon
1939) and Professor Erik Lindahl, The Place of Capital in the Theory of Price, in Studies
in the Theory of Money and Capital 269 (Allen & Unwin 1939) as pointing out that time
and space are important. Debreu, Theory of Value at 35 (cited in note 20). Yet the press
release for Debreu's Nobel prize states:
20141
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must be something that exists and enters our utility function,
that is, something that we do or do not want. The ideas of
"wheat" or "wages" are not well-defined commodities because a
good becomes a commodity only when its characteristics are
precisely specified (for example, the quality of the wheat), as
well as the date and location at which the good is traded. Simi-
larly, labor services become a commodity when the characteris-
tics of the service (was the waiter friendly?) are specified, as well
as the time and the delivery location of the service. 35
The next step in general equilibrium theory is to suppose
that markets are complete, that is, one can trade any desired
commodity. The first welfare theorem states that at a competi-
tive equilibrium-each person chooses the bundle of goods he or
she prefers, and supply equals demand-the allocation is Pareto
efficient. Any change to the competitive equilibrium will make
some party strictly worse off.36
In the context of the model of precaution, the assumption
that markets are complete implies that every action chosen is a
different good with a different price. As Professor Gary Becker
observes, the notion of price used here is not the same as the no-
tion of price in law.37 In the second welfare theorem, price
measures the opportunity cost of the good-technically it is the
Lagrange multiplier 38 associated with the aggregate resource
constraint. Economists talk of the price of the good even when it
is not traded. They mean the marginal value of the resource
constraint, a concept that is very useful when evaluating the ef-
ficiency property of an allocation, but may not correspond to an
observed price.
The concept of "goods", for instance, is defined so broadly that the theory may
be used in pure static equilibrium analysis, the analysis of the spatial distribu-
tion of production and consumption activities, intertemporal analysis and the
analysis of uncertainty. Thus, within the same model, Debreu's general equi-
librium theory integrates the theory of location, the theory of capital, and the
theory of economic behaviour under uncertainty.
Gerard Debreu, Press Release (cited in note 25).
35 Debreu, Theory of Value at 35-36 (cited in note 20).
36 See id at 74-90.
37 Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 6 (Chicago 1976).
38 For a short explanation of how the Lagrange multiplier operates in economic
analysis, see George Loewenstein and Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way
or the Hard Way Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U Chi L Rev 183,
195 (2006).
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Price in law defines the terms of trade for a good exchanged
between two parties-the amount that the seller agrees to pay
the buyer for a good, rather than the shadow value of a good. If
the good delivered is not satisfactory or the buyer does not pay,
then there is breach of contract. In that case Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes observes: "The duty to keep a contract at com-
mon law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you
do not keep it,-and nothing else."39 In other words, if the seller
chooses a quantity or quality different from the agreement, then
the amount she receives will be reduced, normally using the rule
of expectation damages.
In order to distinguish the two concepts of price without
adding too much jargon, we call the former shadow value an
"economic price" and the later transacted value a "contract price."
We can see the difference with a simple example. Suppose that
the seller chooses to deliver or not and agrees to pay damages
for nondelivery. In this case there are two economic prices corre-
sponding to each of the two commodities-the price that is paid
when delivery occurs and the price that is paid when delivery
does not occur.
The law in this case is quite a bit more subtle than the eco-
nomic analysis. In particular, the law distinguishes between
several contract forms. One is a two-part tariff in which the sell-
er can choose to deliver or not, and then is paid the correspond-
ing price (say penalty k when there is no delivery). The second is
a specific liquidated-damages clause requiring k be paid in the
event of nondelivery. 40
In the first case nondelivery is not breach of contract-only
nonpayment is a breach. In contrast, in the second case nonde-
livery is a breach of contract. In the former case, as long as the
seller pays the penalty, there is no breach of contract and the
buyer has no right to bring an action against the seller. In the
second case, the buyer has the right to take the seller to court.
Even if the seller voluntarily pays the stipulated damages, the
buyer has the right to have a court review the dispute, a right
that is denied in the first case. In a world in which going to court
is costly, these contracts are not the same.
39 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 462 (1897).
40 See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Suc-
cess or Failure?, 112 Yale L J 829, 834, 858 (2003).
20141
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Finally, there is the fixed-price contract in which the parties
agree to a price, quantity, and quality of the good to be traded, with
no other terms. In this case nondelivery is a breach of contract,
which gives the buyer the right to a court hearing to determine
damages.41
Scholars often claim that fixed-price contracts are the norm
for many sales contracts, and that this is a puzzle for economics
because the theory predicts different prices in different states of
the world. However, since breach leads to a different allocation
from nonbreach, the contract price may be fixed, but the econom-
ic price is not.42
The development of norms for the production and exchange
of cotton provides an example of the creation of new commodi-
ties. Professor Lisa Bernstein describes the historical evolution
of the private law regarding cotton. 43 One can view the develop-
ment of bright-line rules as the creation of well-defined quality
standards for cotton.44 Once quality standards were specified,
cotton could be traded upon an open market with different qual-
ity goods fetching different prices.
Debreu addresses uncertainty in the context of the commod-
ity model.45 The model begins with the hypothesis that one can
in principle describe all possible world histories (called states),
including all possible future events. In this model, learning can
be viewed like the fog lifting. As time moves on some histories
(states of the world) do not occur, and fewer and fewer possibili-
ties are left, until time fully unfolds and all that remains is a
single state representing all that can be known. An event in this
model is a set of possible states. For example, the event that it
rains today means that all states in which it did not rain have
not occurred.
41 See id at 855.
42 See, for example, id at 859, stating in his discussion of the economic theory of
contract:
The contracts that the models predict do not exist in the world. Instead, we see
simple fixed price contracts or contracts that are conditional on a relatively
small number of real world contingencies. Intuitively, the problem with the
predicted contracts is that they are too complex for parties to design.
43 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724, 1726-39 (2001).
44 Idat 1731.
45 See Debreu, Theory of Value at 98-102 (cited in note 20).
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Uncertainty can be accommodated by allowing a commodity
to be state/event contingent. Consider home insurance. It is a
commodity that pays the buyer an amount L if and only if the
house burns down. There are many possible contracts-L could
be fixed, or L could be a function L(s), which pays the full loss
when a fire of severity s occurs. Such contracts can be bought
and sold in a market.
There are two points worth highlighting. First, bargaining
parties often think in terms of moving the burden of a loss in a
state to one party or the other. Calabresi's seminal article Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts explicitly
addresses this issue and discusses the various meanings that
have been attached to risk sharing.46 The notion of a commodity
illustrates that risk is like any other characteristic of a good.
The allocation of risk across states is an issue of personal pref-
erence, and individuals will differ in their valuation of different
allocations of risk.
The second, subtler point is that the definition of uncertain-
ty does not require a theory of probability! Once payoffs are de-
fined for each state, parties can trade and agree to state-
contingent prices without reference to probability! Probability is
central to the theory of precaution beginning with the Hand
Rule for negligence. But in order to bring probability into the
discussion, we need to turn to ideas outlined by Savage47
III. SAVAGE AND THE THEORY OF DECISION
In this Part we briefly outline the Savage model of decision
making, or choice.48 Savage's work clearly illustrates why the
model of precaution, while useful, does not accurately capture
how individuals think about decisions, nor how a particular le-
gal rule may affect actual choice.
A. The Savage Algorithm and Savage Tables
The Savage algorithm for rational choice follows several
steps. First, a decision maker builds a small world model. This is
46 Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
Yale L J 499, 505 (1961).
47 See generally Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (cited in note 13).
48 See Yoram Halevy and Vincent Feltkamp, A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty
Aversion, 72 Rev Econ Stud 449, 449-51 (2005) (showing how one can integrate behav-
ioral economics into the Savage model).
2014]
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a simplification of the real world since it is impossible for any-
one to contemplate all possible states of the world. Savage
states, "This [that is, the idea that people consider all possible
alternatives and then choose the best] is utterly ridiculous ...
because the task implied in making such a decision is not even
remotely resembled by human possibility. 49
Model building requires the decision maker to identify those
possible states of the world that are relevant to the decision at
hand. A state is a complete description of those possible futures
that are relevant for determining the consequence of a decision.
These might include the possibility of rain, harm to others, and
so on. The focus is on only those states that the decision maker
believes are relevant.
Model building is expensive and time consuming. An imme-
diate implication is that even when the decision maker is so-
phisticated, models will necessarily be incomplete and contain
errors. In contrast, in law and economics, scholars often assume
that sophisticated parties do not make errors. However, the
Savage model suggests that rational parties will sometimes err
and that they may do so because they fail to consider events that
should have been relevant to their decision.5O
Savage calls each choice an "act."' 1 By this he is explicitly
recognizing that choices have uncertain consequences. A number
of outcomes may stem from the decision to bring an umbrella to
work-the umbrella may be lost or the decision maker may use it
when it rains. Conversely, the "act" of not bringing an umbrella to
work ensures that it is safe at home, but the person may get wet
when it rains.
In the famous case of United States v Carroll Towing Co, a
barge broke loose from its moorings and caused an accident. The
decision or act in question was how the bargee adjusted the
mooring lines and whether a crew member was left on board at
night, with the relevant events being whether the barge broke
loose and the consequences of it breaking loose.52
We can formalize the problem as follows. We begin by mod-
eling the possible states of the world and the consequences that
occur in each state. In the context of Carroll Towing suppose
49 Savage, The Foundations of Statistics at 16 (cited in note 13).
50 See id at 139-40.
51 Id at 13.
52 Carroll Towing, 159 F2d at 170-72.
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there are three states, h, m, and 1. State h is the high or good
state corresponding to good weather. The middle state, m, corre-
sponds to, say, strong winds. The low state, 1, corresponds to a
hurricane.
For simplicity, suppose that in the event that the barge
breaks loose, there is a fixed harm of H > 0. If the weather is
good, then the barge never leaves its moorings. If the event is 1,
then the barge always breaks loose, and hence a harm of H is
always suffered.
The interesting case is state m. If care is taken, no harm is
suffered, but if the agent is not careful, the barge leaves its
moorings and causes harm H. We can identify high and low care
with two distinct state-contingent commodities in which the
three values inside the brackets show the harm in each state of
the world under either high effort or low effort on the part of the
bargee:
* High effort: {O, 0, - }
" Low effort: {0, - H, - H
Notice that this is effectively a complete description of the
consequence of different effort levels in different states of the
world.
The next step is to discuss the bargee's choice of effort. We
can suppose that there is no cost to low effort, but high effort
costs c. An act for the bargee would be a mapping between effort
and the payoff consequences for each choice. If there is no liabil-
ity, then the payoffs will be:
* High effort: {- c, - c, - c}
" Low effort: {0, 0, 0}
This information can be summarized in what we dub a
"Savage Table." Each box provides the payoff to the potential
tortfeasors and victim respectively of each possible act in each
possible state:
2014]
The University of Chicago Law Review





aL (0,0) (0, - H) (0, - H)
aH (- c, 0) (- c, 0) (- c, - H)
These acts provide all the information necessary to make a
decision-for each state of the world the decision maker under-
stands the consequence of each action. A rational decision maker
ranks the acts and chooses the one she prefers. In this example
she chooses one action or the other. Decision theory requires on-
ly that the bargee make a choice. In this example, she is better
off choosing aa since she gets zero in this case, and would pay - c
if she chooses all. Notice that probabilities are not needed when
making this choice.
Deciding what to do under a negligence regime that has her
pay H when she causes the accident is a more difficult decision.
In this case the Savage Table is:




aL (0,0) (-H, 0) (0, - H)
aH (- c, 0) (-c, 0) (- c, - H)
Now she has to compare paying c in every state with paying
H in state m. Rational-choice theory requires only that she make
a choice and that her choices are transitive (that is, that she can
consistently rank her decisions) and complete (that is, she
makes a decision). There is no need to formally introduce proba-
bility, though beliefs about probabilities may well be helpful to
making a decision.
[81:53
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What Savage shows is that in situations like this, individu-
als choose as if they have assigned probabilities to the states h,
m, and l. If we let these probabilities be given by:
P = {p, p2, p3}
then the bargee chooses high effort if and only if:
- c-p3 x H>- (p2 +p3) x H
These probabilities are values derived from the preferences
and beliefs of the bargee. There is no reason for the judge and
the bargee to have the same assessment of the likelihood of a
particular state-especially for states that are infrequent. This
argument does not preclude the use of the Hand Rule by judges:
it may be a useful way to determine a legal rule. However, there
is no logical reason to assume that the probabilities used by
judges will affect the decisions of potential tortfeasors in a con-
sistent or even in a predictable fashion. What this simple model
illustrates is how the actions of the bargee are causally related
to outcomes. A different causal question is how the choice of tort
regime, such as the choice of strict liability versus a negligence
standard, affects the choices of individuals in practice. This is
the question that we address next.
B. Potential Outcomes and the Fundamental Problem of
Causal Inference
The idea of a causal relationship has a long history.54 Sav-
age treats causal relationships as an integral element of what it
means to act. In particular, the barge example makes clear that
whether a decision has a causal effect depends upon the state of
nature.
If state 1 or h occurs, then the choice of action has no effect
upon the level of harm. In the low state there is no harm regard-
less of the action of the bargee. This fact does not mean that
there should be no consequence. For example, drunk drivers may
be fined even when they do not cause an accident. Professors
53 See Savage, The Foundations of Statistics at 27-55 (cited in note 13). The exact
conditions are found on the inside of the cover of the Dover edition of the book. See Leon-
ard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (Dover 1972).
54 See, for example, the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in which
there is an extensive bibliography. See Jonathan Schaffer, The Metaphysics of Causation
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2007), online at http://plato.stanford.edulentries
/causation-metaphysics (visited Mar 2, 2014).
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Jennifer Arlen and Bentley MacLeod point out that with judg-
ment-proof tortfeasors, it is efficient to penalize them whenever
they are careless, regardless of whether there is harm.55 They
show that the law of vicarious liability can achieve this effect by
making organizations liable for the torts of their agents. 56
In practice the issue is complicated when the state is impre-
cise, unobserved, or unknowable. Hence, while in theory the def-
inition is clear, in practice whether an act causes an outcome is
often controversial. In economics, the most widely used approach
to this problem is the potential-outcomes approach.57
We introduce this idea and illustrate how to use Savage Ta-
bles from the perspective of the courts, rather than the tortfea-
sor. Suppose that there is a state n, which is a nasty storm simi-
lar to 1, but which would not result in the barge breaking loose if
the bargee chooses al. Suppose the courts are unable to distin-
guish between states n and 1, but they can distinguish between
states h, m, and the combination of {n, l}. In this case the Savage
Table for the bargee in the absence of any tort liability is given by:
TABLE 3. ACTS WITH STATES h, m, n, AND I
State
Action
h m n 1
an (0,0) (0, -H) (0, -H) (0, -H)
aH (- c, 0) (- c, 0) (- c, O) (- c, -- H)
Here states m and n are identical from the perspective of
the bargee. Harm is avoided in both states by taking the precau-
tion. Hence in both states m and n we can say that the bargee
could causally avoid the harm through her actions.
Let us now consider the court's perspective and use the
Savage Table to describe different legal rules-here each rule
can be viewed as an act because it associates an outcome with a
state. Suppose that the acts in the court's choice set are strict
55 See Jennifer Arlen and W. Bentley MacLeod, Torts, Expertise, and Authority:
Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 36 RAND J Econ 494, 497 (2005).
56 See id at 516.
57 See Joshua D. Angrist, Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin, Identification of
Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables, 91 J Am Stat Assn 444, 446 (1996). See
also Holland, 81 J Am Stat Assn at 945 (cited in note 15).
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liability in which the tortfeasor pays H whenever there is an ac-
cident, and the Epstein Rule in which the tortfeasor pays H
whenever she causes an accident. Epstein recommended that
this rule be used rather than the Hand Rule. 58
Table 4 shows how we can use a Savage table to analyze de-
cision making under each rule:
TABLE 4. POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
Events
Harm in Harm in Severe
Acts by No Harm Moderate Storm
Courts Storm
States: (act, weather) combinations
(aL, h) (aH, h) (aH, m) (aH, n) (aL, m) (aL, n) (aL, 1) (aH, 1)
Strict 0 0 0 0 H H H H
Liability
Epstein Rule 0 0 0 0 H ? ? ?
In this simple example, the potential outcomes are "no
harm" or "harm." The court observes the event associated with
the harm. Technically an "event" is a set of states. The term is
used in probability theory to refer to the information known at
the time a decision is taken. In this example, the court observes
only one of the potential outcomes and the severity of the
storm-h, m, or {n or 1}.
In this example it is assumed that the courts cannot observe
the action of the bargee. It is worth highlighting that acts in the
past become part of the description of the state in the future.
That is, the act of the bargee affects the states facing the court.
Thus this model can be adopted to deal with strategic situations,
such as the case of contributory negligence in which the harmed
party can also make decisions that affect the outcome. However,
it is beyond the current Article to explain how this works.59
With the information available, the courts can determine
causality in the state "Harm in Moderate Storm." In that situa-
tion harm occurs if and only if the bargee is not careful-in other
words the courts can both infer the action of the bargee and note
58 See Epstein, 2 J Legal Stud at 203 (cited in note 8).
59 For details, see Kreps and Wilson, 50 Econometrica at 863 (cited in note 22).
20141
The University of Chicago Law Review
that there is causation. Hence, Epstein's Rule can be applied
and liability assigned to the bargee.
In the event "Harm in Severe Storm" the exact severity of
the storm is unknown, and we cannot tell if harm could have
been avoided. Technically causation is well defined-that is the
agent caused the harm if and only if she choose aL and the state
of the weather was n. If instead the state was 1, then nothing the
bargee could have done would have stopped the harm. If state n
were not possible, then we would be back to the original situa-
tion in which nothing the bargee can do would avoid harm in the
event of a storm, and under both the Hand Rule and the Epstein
Rule there would be no liability.
In practice, it is not possible to directly observe all the
primitive states in a decision problem. Is there a way, at least
conceptually, to measure the causal effect? Holland provides an
elegant synthesis of the potential-outcome approach that pro-
vides a solution and has become very influential in economics.60
Rather than attempt to build a complex-state space model, the
potential-outcomes approach is very pragmatic and is based upon
relationships between observed variables.
In this example, the potential outcomes are No Harm and
Harm. Let Y(a) be the outcome if action a is chosen, where Y = 1
if harm occurs and Y = 0 if not. The counterfactual question is,
what would happen if the bargee chose high effort instead of low
effort? The causal effect of high effort is then defined by:
(1) CE = Y(aH) - Y(aL).
The point here is that this effect is measured after the state
of nature has been revealed. Holland observes that there is only
one sure way that we could measure (1).61 It would require hav-
ing the bargee choose low effort and observing the result. We
would then have to go back in time to the exact same situation,
choose high effort, and observe the result. Going back in time
would ensure that the same state occurred again, and we would
then be able to see the counterfactual effect of changing effort. If
60 See Holland, 81 J Am Stat Assn at 959 (cited in note 15). For the application of
this approach to economics, see Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 91 J Am Stat Assn at 446
(cited in note 57); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the
Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 Yale L J 2270, 2295 (2012) (il-
lustrating the application of the potential-outcomes framework to the question of how
Supreme Court decisions affect the outcomes in related cases).
61 See Holland, 81 J Am Stat Assn at 959 (cited in note 15).
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we had a time machine then, like the hapless hero in the movie
Groundhog Day, we could experiment with different life experi-
ences until we made the best choices.62 This is clearly impossi-
ble, an observation that Holland calls the "Fundamental Prob-
lem of Causal Inference.63
Holland's contribution is to illustrate a way of thinking
about and measuring causality without directly observing the
deep structure of the environment (whether the state is n or 1 in
our example). Suppose, for example, we want to know the causal
effect of penicillin. What is often done is to take a group of sick
patients and treat some with penicillin and some with a placebo.
Under the assumption that the sick patients are all similar,
then we will be able to deduce the action of the drug by compar-
ing the two groups. Note that conducting this type of trial does
not require knowledge of the exact mechanism through which
the drug works. It does require a strong assumption about the
similarity of the patients. We now know, for example, that peni-
cillin is not equally effective against all infections, so if the pa-
tients had different types of infection, or if some of them were al-
lergic to penicillin, then this would affect the results of the trial.
What we learn from Savage's model is that the problem of
determining causality is one of information and not philosophy.
The fact that we cannot observe the deep structure of every case
before the courts implies that there are situations in which cau-
sality is indeterminate. No amount of philosophizing can substi-
tute for this lack of information. In the next Part we discuss how
the Savage model can be used to discuss tort doctrine. The mod-
el teaches us there cannot be an optimal rule that applies to eve-
ry situation.
IV. TORT LAW
Tort law allows individuals freedom of action, but assigns
liability in states of the world that cause harm to others. Let us
return to the Savage Table used to represent the Hand model of
62 Groundhog Day (Columbia Pictures 1993). In the film, Bill Murray plays Phil
Connors, an arrogant TV weatherman who is in a time loop repeating the day over and
over until he finally learns to become a good person. Like Holland's article, critical ap-
preciation of the movie has increased over time, and it was listed in the United States
Film Registry in 2006. See National Film Registry, National Film Preservation Board
(Library of Congress Dec 13, 2011), online at http://www.loc.gov/film/registry-titles.php
(visited Mar 2, 2014).
63 Holland, 81 J Am Stat Assn at 947 (cited in note 15) (emphasis omitted).
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precaution. The most general tort rule in this case can be writ-
ten as:
TABLE 5. GENERAL TORT RULE
Action h State
an (0,0) (-L, Lm - H) (-L1, Li- H)
aH (- c, 0) (- c, 0) (-Li- c, Li- H)
If courts can observe the state, the issue is how to set Lm
and Li. A necessary condition for liability under the negligence
rule is that the action of the agent must cause the injury. That
cannot occur in state 1 and thus Li = 0 under the negligence re-
gime. Under the Hand Rule the tortfeasor is liable in state m if
and only if the expected harm is greater than cost: pmH > c. The
relevant probability is not necessarily an objective quantity but
a value established by the court (though of course objective evi-
dence may be used to determine the probability).
Consider now the famous case of Helling v Carey,64 a mal-
practice action against ophthalmologists in which a patient
claimed that she suffered permanent visual damage due to glau-
coma as a result of defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the
condition. Ophthalmologists rarely performed glaucoma tests on
young patients, and the court found for the defendants at trial.
However, upon appeal, the appellate court used the Hand Rule
to argue that since the cost of the test was very low, it should be
administered as a matter of practice. The decision was reversed
and returned to the trial court to assess damages.65
In the context of our model of actions and states of the
world, we can represent the court's view of the ophthalmologists'
problem this way:
64 519 P2d 981 (Wash 1974).
65 Id at 983.
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TABLE 6. NEGLIGENCE RULE
i State
ActionAB A B C
aL (0,0) (-H, 0) (0, - H)
aH (- C, O) (-c, O) (- c, -H)
While in state A the patient does not have glaucoma, in
state B the patient has glaucoma, and in state C the patient has
some other serious eye disease.
The key point is that the rule followed by the court and
illustrated in Table 6 is not necessarily the rule followed by most
ophthalmologists when they decide how to treat their patients.
Arguably, ophthalmologists are concerned with providing ap-
propriate care. If the court determines that it is negligent to
omit a glaucoma test, then medical practice is likely to change in
the direction of always doing the glaucoma test.
Note that it is not even clear that the Hand Rule was ap-
plied correctly in this case. The total cost of testing millions of
people without the disease could be greater than the benefit of
detecting one case of the disease unless the cost of blindness is
infinite. But in terms of influencing ophthalmologists' behavior,
the true costs and benefits are irrelevant once the court has spo-
ken. Similar issues come up in the case of screening for prostate
cancer, or doing mammograms on women under fifty. Even
though experts now agree that the costs of such screening may
exceed the benefits, the screenings remain embedded in medical
practice.66 The fact that the court uses the Hand Rule does not
require individual decision makers to use the same rule. The
standard law-and-economics approach evaluates different tort
rules as if the potential tortfeasors make decisions using the
Hand Rule. The example of the ophthalmologists suggests that
this is an error! Individuals do modify their behavior in response
to incentives, but there is little evidence that courts are good at
predicting their responses.
66 See Lydia E. Pace, Yulei He, and Nancy L. Keating, Trends in Mammography
Screening Rates after Publication of the 2009 US Preventive Services Task Force Recom-
mendations, 119 Cancer 2518, 2521-22 (2013); Virginia A. Moyer, Screening for Prostate
Cancer: U.S. Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 157 Annals In-
ternal Med 120, 122-23 (2012).
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Individuals often respond to incentives in unexpected ways.
For example, Professor Steven Kerr provides many examples
from successful firms of incentive systems with unintended con-
sequences.6 7 Another example comes from the Lincoln Electric
Company.68 It wired a secretary's typewriter to measure keystrokes
and tied her compensation to the number of strokes. The secre-
tary responded by spending her lunch breaks hitting a single
key on her typewriter!
Legal doctrines, such as the defense of contributory negli-
gence, evolve in response to cases that document the behavior of
individuals in specific situations. The building of a model or
worldview focused on a small number of actions and states may
ignore some important possibilities.
A. Strict Liability vs. the Negligence Rule
The framework we have developed is helpful for illustrating
the difference between strict liability (in which the tortfeasor is
liable whenever there is harm) and the negligence rule (in which
the tortfeasor is liable only if he is negligent). We will illustrate
the difference in behavior under these two rules using the model
with actions and states applied to the case of the Good Samari-
tan doctor.
The potential Good Samaritan can exert high effort, low ef-
fort, or he can take evasive actions to avoid liability completely.
For example, a physician who happens on a traffic accident can
leave the scene unobserved, failing to disclose that he is a physi-
cian. As in the case United States v Carroll Towing Co, let us
suppose that the courts cannot perfectly establish causation.
Under strict liability we have:
67 See Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A, while Hoping for B, 18 Acad
Mgmt J 769, 769-79 (1975).
68 See Norman A. Berg, The Lincoln Electric Company 6, Harvard Business School
Case No 9-376-028 (Harvard 1975).
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Light Injury Moderate Injury Severe Injury
aL (0,0) (-H, 0) (-H, 0) (- H, 0)
aH (- c, O) (-c, O) (-c, O) (-(H + c), 0)
ao (-u,-H (- u,-H) (-u,-H) (- u,-H)
Here the first term in each bracket is the payoff to the doc-
tor while the second is the payoff to the patient. Assume that all
the court can observe is whether the injury is light, moderate, or
severe. In the case of severe injury, the court cannot tell whether
the physician could have ameliorated the injury or not. We also
assume that the court cannot observe evasive actions and if ao is
chosen there is never any liability. We further assume that the
potential Good Samaritan must choose an action without know-
ing the full extent of the victim's injuries. The payoff - u is the
disutility or guilt felt by the Good Samaritan if he does not treat.
Causation here is necessarily probabilistic. Epstein argues
that one should use the rule of strict liability whenever there is
causation.69 But in the case of "Severe Injury" it is not possible
for the courts to establish causality. They are forced to assign
probabilities to states. Moreover, the physician can always com-
pletely avoid liability by choosing ao. Epstein argues that physi-
cians should be held liable in these cases while Posner disa-
grees, pointing out that the Good Samaritan can always find a
way to avoid the situation. 7°
More importantly, if the potential Good Samaritan faces
strict liability, then he has a positive incentive to avoid becoming
involved. Instead, one would like to provide positive incentives to
act when it will be helpful. If we interpret the negligence rule as
imposing liability only if there has been harm in state m, then if
u > c, the Good Samaritan would always act. Hence, the negli-
gence rule could improve outcomes relative to strict liability by
improving the incentives faced by the Good Samaritan.
69 See Epstein, 2 J Legal Stud at 203 (cited in note 8).
70 See id at 199; Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 219-20 (cited in note 10).
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Notice that in the case of Helling v Carey the requirement to
do a glaucoma test is easy to implement, and if the test is viewed
as a standard part of an eye exam, then the ophthalmologist will
include the cost in the standard bill.g1 In other words, compli-
ance with the tort system is much easier when individuals know
that liability is triggered by well-defined events.
Consider next the case of product liability, in which the rule
of strict liability is normally used. In that case the default action
is the nonproduction of the good. Consider the use of sports
equipment such as skis or skateboards, with which the nature of
an injury depends upon the intensity of the use. The courts can
observe the intensity, but in the case of intensive use, the court
may have difficulty determining whether an injury is the result
of product failure or an unavoidable result of the activity itself.
The payoff matrix from the perspective of the seller can be writ-
ten as:




Light Moderate Extreme Activity
Activity Activity
aL (P, u) (P, u-H) (P, u-H) (P, u-IH)
aH (P-c, u) (P- c, u) (P c, (P ,u -H) u -H)
ao (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
In this case the seller pays the harm H regardless of wheth-
er he takes appropriate precaution. What differentiates this case
from the medical liability case is that evasive action prevents
the good from being produced, and hence prevents harm.
In a world with perfect information, the cost of harm can
always be offset via the price. The difficulty is that in general
there is asymmetric information-individuals cannot observe aL
or aH and hence they are not in a position to evaluate the good.
Moreover, the seller may have a better idea than the buyer
about the range of ways the product will be used. Under strict
71 Helling, 519 P2d at 983.
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liability, sellers internalize harms from the use of the product,
even when the product failure might not be caused by their ac-
tions. Strict liability provides a positive incentive for the manu-
facturer to learn about the potential harm before production be-
gins. Once production has started, the manufacturer has a
positive incentive to avoid learning about state 1 after the fact.
In contrast to the medical-liability case in which harm occurs if
the physician does not act, here harm occurs only if the manu-
facturer acts.
The use of Savage Tables highlights both the considera-
tions that are included in the analysis, as well as those that are
excluded. There will always be both states of the world and acts
that are not considered ex ante by either the courts or individu-
als. We do not exclude the use of probabilities, but highlight the
fact that probabilities are values that are determined after one
has built a model of the world that defines the relevant states.
B. Informed Consent
Medical services are generally covered by the negligence
rule, which not only reduces the incentive for physicians to
withhold services, but allows the standard of care to vary over
time.72 From the perspective of the Savage model, medical ser-
vices are acts that represent complex commodities that include
the possibility that there is harm to the patient. Tort law can be
viewed as enforcing a contract defined in terms of the perfor-
mance of the physician, rather than in terms of the goods sup-
plied (which may include harm).
Savage Tables highlight the fact that services are necessari-
ly state contingent. When a physician provides services there is
no guarantee that the patient will be cured, only that the physi-
cian will do her best to provide appropriate care. Whenever sur-
gery is performed there is a chance of misadventure. Doctors can
miss symptoms and fail to diagnose conditions that with hind-
sight they should have seen. The product they are selling is not
a good outcome, but the promise to do a good job.
The requirement that the standard of care meets communi-
ty standards is nothing more than an obligation to provide a
service with certain characteristics. The negligence rule as
72 See Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medi-
cine?, 111 Q J Econ 353, 356-58 (1996).
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modeled using the model of precaution requires that the care
supplied meets community standards. Yet, community stand-
ards are a moving target. For example, Scott v Bradford73 estab-
lished that providing information about available alternatives
and obtaining informed consent is "as essential as a physician's
care and skill."74 The services provided by physicians are com-
plex commodities in the sense of Debreu, and their nature varies
over time.
It is likely that the concept of the commodity represented by
medical care will continue to evolve. In our most recent work,75
we distinguish between the diagnostic skill and surgical skill of
obstetricians. In the context of the current discussion, we can
think of the commodity the physician supplies as a complex good
consisting of both aspects of skill. We show that while higher
surgical skill is beneficial to high-risk women, better diagnostic
skill benefits both high- and low-risk women, since both groups
benefit from better matching of medical procedures to their
needs7 6
Savage reminds us that the act of building a model is an ex-
plicit tool used in the process of making a thoughtful decision 77
Given that perfect models are not possible, it also highlights the
dangers of relying solely upon a theoretical model when evaluat-
ing the quality of a legal rule. In the next Part we discuss empir-
ical evaluations of tort law.
V. THE CAUSAL IMPACT OF LEGAL RULES UPON BEHAVIOR
Using Savage Tables, we have presented a number of exam-
ples of how tort law affects individual decisions. To recap, the
first step in the rational-choice model is thinking in terms of po-
tential outcomes, states, and acts. In some situations, the model
allows us to evaluate rules without reference to probabilities.
Even if a potential tortfeasor is fully rational, her model of the
world does not have to correspond to a court's.
73 606 P2d 554 (Okla 1979).
74 Id at 556-57.
75 See generally Janet Currie and W. Bentley MacLeod, Diagnosis and Unnecessary
Procedure Use: Evidence from C-Section (NBER Working Paper No 18977, Apr 2013),
online at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8977 (visited Mar 2, 2014).
76 See id at *26-33.
77 See Savage, The Foundations of Statistics at 27-31 (cited in note 13).
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We have also shown that strict liability and negligence can
create different incentives to build a detailed model of the world.
Under strict liability a manufacturer has an incentive to consid-
er possible states in which the consumer might be harmed by its
product. If we rely instead upon market pricing, then the cost of
investigating these events would be moved to the consumer, who
would typically have considerably fewer resources and less expe-
rience to carry out such an exercise.
Conversely, the negligence standard allows individuals to
act and supply services free of liability as long as they meet
community standards of behavior. This rule creates an incentive
to take precaution while reducing the incentive to withhold ser-
vices in situations in which there is a chance of harm, as in the
case of the Good Samaritan physician.
Given that individuals are likely to build different models
of the world when making choices, there is no a priori way of
determining the impact of a legal rule in practice.78 Here we
briefly discuss a few contributions that directly address this issue
and that show that in fact tort law does lead to deterrence.
As we discussed in the causality Part above, estimating the
causal impact of the law upon behavior is very difficult. Many
factors are changing at the same time, and hence it is difficult to
know if observed changes are due to a rule or due to some unob-
served factor. In keeping with the discussion above, theoretical
models of tort tend to emphasize particular types of incentives to
the exclusion of others, with the result that they will not always
make the best empirical predictions. Hence, it is necessary to
turn to the data. One of the best ways to measure the effect of
the law is to view the United States as a laboratory in which
each state sets its own rules.
Even though the United States has a common culture, one
cannot use cross-state variation in rules to look at the effect of
the law. Each state has a unique history, meaning that observed
rules and outcomes have multiple sources. Rather, the standard
approach is to use variations over time to explore the causal ef-
fect of a rule. The idea is that we can compare relevant outcomes
in the year before and after a rule change to see if there is an ef-
fect upon behavior. In this approach, the state before the rule
change is used as the best approximation to what the state
78 See Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 220-21 (cited in note 10).
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would have been like had the rule change not taken place. Even
this approach has drawbacks, as discussed by Professor Mari-
anne Bertrand et al,9 but for the moment it is the source of the
best evidence of the effect of legal rules.
Professors Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia have a nice
study looking at the effect of the introduction of no-fault auto-
mobile insurance upon traffic fatalities.0 They use variations in
state laws regarding no-fault insurance over the 1970 to 1998
period and find that a move from a regime with fault to no fault
causes a 6 percent increase in traffic fatalities. What one cannot
exclude is the possibility that changes in the law are associated
with changes in the population that are themselves correlated
with accident rates and the passage of the law.81
This issue is more easily addressed in the context of medical
care. Professors Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan explore the
impact that changes in state law have on the outcomes of elderly
heart attack patients on Medicare.82 Heart attack patients are a
good group to study because they generally go to the nearest
hospital and don't cross state lines to get into a better hospital.
They find that a reduction in tort liability has a small, close-to-
insignificant effect upon patient outcomes, but a large negative
effect upon costs.8 3
Kessler and McClellan use rather broad tort categories. For
example, they treat reform to the collateral-source rule and the
rule of joint and several liability as a single rule change.84 We
update the law data and use finer granularity regarding the
law. We explore the effect of tort reform upon both the inci-
dence of C-sections and outcomes of the mother and child.85
We find that a decrease in liability (either reducing the cap
on damages or disallowing harm due to pain and suffering) leads
to an increase in C-section rates. 86 Many find this result counter-
intuitive because there has been so much discussion of the idea
79 See Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much
Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q J Econ 249, 272-74 (2004).
80 See Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Ac-
cident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J L & Econ 357, 378-82 (2004).
81 See id at 371-89.
82 See Kessler and McClellan, 111 Q J Econ at 363 (cited in note 72).
83 See id at 372-88.
84 See id at 371-72.
85 See Janet Currie and W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and
Birth Outcomes, 123 Q J Econ 795, 796-98 (2008).
86 See id at 819-25.
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that C-sections are a form of defensive medicine. In a world in
which doctors were starting from the optimal C-section rate and
were always acting in the best interests of their patients, then
fear of lawsuits might push them to do more C-sections. This is
the type of thinking that is based upon the model of precau-
tion-tort liability leading doctors to be more careful to avoid
bad outcomes and hence to higher C-section rates.87 However,
the real world C-section rate is thought to be much higher than
necessary, suggesting that the marginal C-section is an unnec-
essary surgery that is not in the best interests of the patient.
That is, there are other forces leading doctors to perform unnec-
essary surgeries, and this tendency is restrained by the tort sys-
tem. Therefore, when liability is reduced, C-sections rise.88 This
counterintuitive result provides a concrete demonstration of the
dangers of relying on an overly simplistic model of precaution
without adequate empirical evidence.
The study's second lesson concerns the importance of deal-
ing with heterogeneous treatment effects. Most of the variation
in C-section rates occurs for women whose medical condition is
in a gray area-that is, there is some indication that a C-section
may be appropriate, but it is a question of judgment. For these
marginal cases, the gain from a C-section is close to the cost.
8 9
However, C-sections are surgeries and there are a number of
tort cases involving botched C-sections. A rise in C-section rates
as a consequence of reduced liability is consistent with poor sur-
geons increasing their C-section rates because they know they
are less likely to be sued. We also find that the law has no effect
upon high-risk patients, for whom a C-section is more likely and
the quality of the physician is likely to be higher. 90
Another surprising result comes from our work on the re-
form of the doctrine of joint and several liability (JSL).91 When
there are multiple tortfeasors in a regime of JSL, a plaintiff can
recover all of her losses from a single defendant. However, this
does not mean that the other defendants escape liability. Landes
and Posner explore the contribution movement in the United
87 See id at 795-97.
88 See id at 819-26.
89 See Currie and MacLeod, 123 Q J Econ at 814-18 (cited in note 85).
90 See id at 819-26.
91 See generally Daniel Carvell, Janet Currie, and W. Bentley MacLeod, Accidental
Death and the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 43 RAND J Econ 51 (2012).
20141
The University of Chicago Law Review
States--contribution is a rule change that allowed the defendant
who is found liable to recover losses from the other tortfeasors.92
There has been a move to modify JSL to a regime in which
each tortfeasor is responsible only for the harm he or she have
caused. One of the motivations comes from the area of medical
malpractice. When there is a bad medical outcome, it is common
to list hospital nurses as codefendants. Under the respondeat
superior doctrine, and with JSL, the hospital could end up liable
for the full amount of damages because nurses are employees of
the hospital.
Several observers have pointed out that the new rule does
not in fact change overall liability because, for example, the hos-
pital could sue doctors for contribution. Hence, one might expect
the rule change to have no impact on behavior. However, Car-
vell, Currie, and MacLeod point out that in the real world, other
defendants are often judgment-proof. Under JSL it may not be
worthwhile for the deep-pocketed defendant to sue the others for
contribution, especially if they are judgment proof. With reform,
even if another tortfeasor is judgment proof, the deep-pocketed
defendant may have an incentive to join him or her to the case
in order to reduce his own liability. We show that this is not on-
ly a theoretical possibility, but that there is evidence that JSL
reform has reduced the rate of accidental death in the United
States.93
VI. DISCUSSION
The model of precaution is an excellent first-order way to
think about how individuals respond to incentives. It is never-
theless a relatively crude tool that necessarily relies upon value
judgments-the subjective evaluation of how alternative choices
by the tortfeasor might lead to different consequences. In this
Article we have discussed how combining the model of commodi-
ties introduced in general equilibrium theory with the standard
economic model of rational choice developed by Savage allows us
to look at decision making with the help of a Savage Table-a
table that makes explicit the fact that a decision or act is a
state-contingent commodity.94
92 See Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 191 (cited in note 4).
93 See Carvell, Currie, and MacLeod, 43 RAND J Econ at 69-74 (cited in note 91).
94 See generally Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (cited in note 13).
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Savage emphasized that careful consideration of the future
states that might occur is the first step in making a rational
choice. Understanding that a commodity is a good with specific
characteristics including time and location is essential to creat-
ing these models. Savage solved a fundamental problem in ra-
tional choice theory by freeing the decision maker from the need
to have a correct model of the world that considers every possible
contingency and from the need to know the true probabilities as-
sociated with all states of the world. Clearly, such a model would
be impossibly complex, and true probabilities are unknowable.
Rather, Savage argued that actual decision making involves a
simplified model of the world that focuses on likely events and
that once a decision maker has built her worldview, then the
probability of an event is constructed from her preferences and
subjective beliefs. In other words, it is necessary to first decide
the set of possibly relevant outcomes before one can think about
assigning probability weights to them.
This perspective focuses attention on the different events
that are likely to lead to harm. These events, and the liability
associated with them, can be discussed without necessarily ap-
pealing to underlying probabilities. This is a useful innovation
because evidence presented in court can be viewed as carefully
specifying the events leading up to a particular outcome. In
some cases decisions can be reached without appealing to
probabilities, as in cases in which the rule of strict liability
is involved, or when a previous case has already established lia-
bility for the case at hand.
Within the context of the Savage model, causality is always
clear and unambiguous. However, the model is also able to cap-
ture the fact that decision makers may be unable to determine
causal relationships from the evidence at hand. We briefly dis-
cussed the fundamental problem of causal inference that states
that, in general, determining a causal effect is impossible. Ra-
ther, the inference of causality is a function of how we believe
the world operates and in that sense requires a model of the
world.
Even if the courts have a good model of the world and are
able to correctly apply the Hand Rule, there is no reason to ex-
pect individuals to have the same model of the world or to be-
have in a way consistent with the Hand Rule. If everyone's deci-
sion making is governed by his or her own model of the world
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and his or her own subjective probabilities, then it should not be
surprising that people faced with what appear to be similar sit-
uations will make different decisions.
The Savage approach assigns consequences to events. This
is a more concrete activity than attempting to assess the proba-
bility of all possible events. Hence, whether or not the courts use
the Hand Rule for the determination of negligence, it is more
useful to a decision maker if he or she can reliably assign le-
gal liability to a specific event via a bright-line rule. Doing so
removes an element of uncertainty in the law by reducing reli-
ance upon necessarily subjective and most likely incorrect as-
sessments of probabilities.
Like Posner, we conclude that the only real way to know
how a law affects people's behavior is to conduct empirical stud-
ies.95 We have discussed some empirical studies that address the
effects of changes in tort law. Possibly one of the most challeng-
ing questions going forward is to better understand the causal
impact of legal rules on individual behavior, as well as how to
use this information to improve legal rule making.
95 See Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 220-21 (cited in note 10).
